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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
State of Utah 
In the matter of the Estate of 
ORA BlTNDY, 
Deceased 
DOR ... ~ B. GODD.A.RD and 
JOHN A. BUNDY, 
Appellants, 
vs. 
LO-YINA R. BUNDY, as 
Administratrix and Personally, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 7540 
RESPONDENr·s BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following statement in brief, coupled with the 
Statement of Facts of Appellants, will give to the Court 
a broad perspective of the case. Other facts, it is felt, 
are more appropriately shown in argument to avoid 
repetition. 
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Subsequent to the death, on June 12, 1946, of Ora 
Bundy, a petition for Letters of Administration was 
filed, on June 21, 1946, by his widow. On July 8, 1946, 
after notice and hearing, she was appointed Adminis-
tratrix; qualified on such day; and Letters were issued 
to her. Thereupon she entered upon the duties of Ad-
Ininistratrix, accomplishing those tasks normally per-
formed by an Administratix of an estate, including the 
1natters of creditors claims; inventories, for County, 
State and Federal purposes; sales of real and personal 
property; marshaling of assets; sought family allow-
ance; made partial distributions; made an interium ac-
counting; and on May 16, 1949, she filed her second and 
final account and report and petition for final distribu-
tion. Extraordinary activities were undertaken during 
the proceedings, in liquidating Ora Bundy & Co., a co-
partnership consisting of decedent, and the three heirs 
of this estate, namely the widow, son and daughter of 
decedent, resulting in the bringing into the estate of 
$61,364.32. The performance of this activity was a nee-
. essary adjunct to the fulfillment of the primary activity 
of administering decedent's estate, and encompassed 
the handling of more than 150 · banking transactions, 
alone, with inumerable other and varied activities, the 
number of which coul~ only be speculated upon. 
Throughout the probate .proceedings, efforts were 
n1ade to reach an agreement among the heirs, as fron1 
the commencement of the proceedings was the intent of 
all the heirs, as to mode of distribution encompassing the 
distribution of some assets to others, not heirs at law·, 
and for distribution to the heirs of the remaining iten1s 
of the estate in the kind of property (cash, real estate, 
bonds, etc.) desired by each. It appearing finally that 
no such agreement could be reached, at that time, a final 
distribution, according to law, was sought, but the way 
"\vas left open by the prayer of the petition that dis-
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tribution be under the laws of succession, ''or in ·such 
la,vful fashion as may be agreed upon by the heirs at 
la\v prior to final distribution.'' ( R 159). 
The petition therefore came on for hearing May 31, 
1949; was continued under order of the Court to J nne 
27, 1949, while heirs were negotiating for partial parti-
tion incident to distribution, and finally objections to 
Accounts of Administratrix and Cross Petition was filed 
July 8, 1949, and a copy served on the attorney for Ad-
ministratrix July 21, 1949. 
Hearings 'vere had by the Court ; Findings of Facts, 
Conclusions of Law and Decree were made and entered. 
The appeal in this case is directed to seven several 
points set forth in Appellants' Brief, to which Re-
spondent, rn answer,. says: 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
Point 1. Into the possession of Administratrix, 
came no furniture belonging to this estate, which has not 
been accounted for therein. 
la. Appellants' proffer of instrument to at-
tempt to show proof of intention as to ownership was 
properly refused. 
Point 2. The evidence fully supports the Trial 
Court's finding that John A. Bundy has received all his 
share of the property of the estate, and he is not entitled 
to a further distribution. 
Point 3. The administratrix was properly allowed 
credit upon her accounting for family allowance. 
, 3a. The Order for Family Allowance is valid 
and no extrinsic fraud was committed by .Respondent. 
3b. The Order for Family Allowance is valid, 
and is supported by the pleading and the record. 
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3c. The Order of the Court striking Appel-
lant's allegations of fraud, etc., from their objections 
was effective and free of error. 
3d. The Court, in the exercise of its sound 
discretion, properly allowed the credit for family al-
lowance. 
Point 4. Administratrix has not delayed closing of 
estate beyond August 27, 1947, and the receipt of family 
allowance subsequent to partial distribution was proper, 
authorized and confirmed. 
Point 5. Compensation to the Administratrix was 
properly allowed. 
5a. The Court properly refused introduction 
of evidence of· the claim of Waiver of Administratrix 
Commissions. 
5b. Administratrix has been guilty of no 
misconduct. 
Point 6. The determination by the Court that 
$100.00 is the amount chargeable to Administratrix for 
a 10 foot strip of real property was proper. 
Point 7. Appellants' motion for leave to file out of 
time and motion to amend Findings and Decree and their 
motion for a new trial, were properly denied by the 
Court. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1. Into the possession of Administratrix 
came no furniture belonging to this estat-e, which has not 
been accounted for therein. 
At the death of decedent there was furniture at two 
places: 1. At a home in Brigham City, owned and titled 
in the decedent, and occupied by Jack Bundy; and 2. At 
a home in Ogden owned and titled in the widow, and oc-
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. 
cupied by the now widow and decedent in his lifefnne. 
,~rith respect to the furniture in Brigham City, it 
consisted in part of furntiure purchased by Jack Bundy 
originally; some purchased by the decedent; and furni-
ture owned by the widow, loaned for furnishing the 
house. The furniture purchased by Jack Bundy was 
bought by decedent from Jack Bundy and subsequently . 
that furniture was given back to Jack Bundy by 
decedent, it was claimed by the Appellants, and although 
there was no proof of such gift inter vivos, Adminis-
tratix acted upon the assumption that such was the fact, 
and none of such furniture was deemed to be an asset of 
this estate. Appellants at all times were aware of the 
position taken by the Administratrix, with respect to this 
matter, and no objection was ·heretofore raised. 
The position of the Appellants in this matter now 
is not clear; and Respondent cannot determine whether 
Appellant Dora B. Goddard now contends such furniture 
should be a part of the estate of the decedent, contrary 
to her prior position that it belonged to Jack Bundy; or 
whether Appellant Jack Bundy abondons his prior clailn 
of individual ownership and contends now that this furni-
ture belongs to the estate. 
If this furniture be determined to be an asset of the 
estate rather than an asset of Appellant J aek Bundy in-
dividually, Respondent of course, makes no objection, 
but states that the non inventory of this asset was by 
reason of representations made by Appellants them-
selves. · 
·The proceeds of sale of the furniture owned by the 
decedent have been accounted for in the estate. 
The furniture owned by the widow in the Brigham 
City house was, of course, not inventoried as a part of 
the decedent's estate. · . 
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With respect to the furniture in the home of the 
widow in Ogden, it is apparent that some of the furniture 
was owned by decedent prior to his marriage, some by 
Respondent prior to her marriage with decedent, some 
was purchased by the decedent subsequent to the mar-
riage, some were gifts made by the decendent to his wife 
for particular occasions; the bulk of the furniture in the 
house at the time of the death of the decedent was pur-
chased betw~en 1940 and 1942. (Tr. 18). The house 
was built in 1939. All of these items of furniture were 
located in the home and residence of respondent which 
home was owned by her and always had been owned by 
her. And all items of furniture, fixtures and equipment 
of the home ever since 1939 had been in and a part of 
Respondent's premises. And all furniture, subsequent 
to 1926 when the marriage of decedent and Respondent 
was solemnized, had been in use and in the sole custody 
and control of decendent and Respondent as man and 
wife. 
Among such furniture was a grand piano and bench, 
(Tr. 14), and constantly Appellant Dora Goddard has 
claimed such items of furniture as a gift from her father. 
Respondent, while having been uncertain as to whether 
or not a gift inter vivos of these items was made to Dora 
Goddard, and despite the fact that Dora Goddard was 
married in December 1939 (Tr. 12), and lived away from 
, Respondents home yet did not assume control of these 
'items of furniture, knows, that it was the desire of 
decedent that Dora Goddard ultimately have the grand . 
piano and bench, and she now has such items. Whether 
it is now the contention of Appellant Dora Goddard that 
such items as she has were items which belonged to the 
estate and should have been inventoried and accounted 
for therein, or whether she still contends such items to be 
hers individually and not those of the estate, cannot be 
determined from her brief. The position of Appellant 
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Jack Bundy in these n1atters, likewise is not ascertain-
able and Respondent cannot tell whether he contests 
Dora Goddard's claim to individual ownership of said 
iteins or agrees with her that there was a gift inter vivos 
of these items to her. Repondent, rightfully or wrong-
fully, has assu1ned that the representations of ownership 
were correct and her activities with respect to such ite1ns 
were based upon Appellants' representations. In any 
event Appellant Jack Bundy contends such items to be-
long to the estate, such position is unique in as 1nuch as 
he has never heretofor so claimed. 
It appears on analysis that to make comprehensive 
or intelligible whatever the joint appeal of Dora B. God-
dard and Jack Bundy on this point, it must be that in 
·effect Dora says, the furniture I claim is mine, is mine; 
what Jack claims is his, is his: Jack says, the furniture 
I claim is mine, is mine; what Dora claims is hers, is hers. 
None of this property manifestly should be inventoried 
or accounted for in the estate for Respondent has not, 
nor does now, claim -to the contrary. Both Appellants 
jonitly contend what the widow has and claims in furni-
ture is not hers, but is the property of the estate. 
The District Court has held that there was no furni-
ture belonging to this estate which has not been account-
ed for therein and such holding is amply supported by 
evidence, the testimony, and the law. 
The following statue from Utah Code Annotated 
1943, is helpful in the determination on this point. 
'' 101-4-6 HOMESTEAD - EXEMPT PROPERTY 
A homestead as provided by section 1, Title 
Homesteads, together with all personal property 
exempt from execution, shall be wholly exempt from 
the payment of the debts of the decedent, and shall 
be the absolute property of the surviving husband 
or wife and minor children, or of the minor children 
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in case there is no surviving husband or wife, or 
of the surviving husband or wife in case there are 
no minor children, to be set apart on petition and 
notice, at any time after the return of the inven-
tory." 
(Under scoring ours) 
The exemptions from execution are found in the 
Code at 104-37-13 and include briefly, chairs, tables and 
desks, library musical instruments in actual use in the 
family, necessary household, table and kitchen furniture, 
sewing machine, pictures, paintings, carpets, etc. 
In view of the foregoing facts, and provisions of the 
Statutes, the Court's refusal to accept Appellant's Ex-
hibit 1, was not error. Had it been accepted however, 
it would have confirmed the intention of decedent that 
the widow have the furniture claimed by her. The fol-
lowing is an excertp from said exhibit. 
''All furnishings (except the grand piano which 
belongs to Dora B. Goddard) is left to my beloved 
wife, Lovina R. Bundy.'' 
Point 2. The evidence fully supports the Trial 
Court's finding that John A. Bundy has received all his 
share of the property of the estate and he is not entitled 
to a further distribution. 
The District Court having accidently over heard per-
sons say that Jack Bundy had sold them things; that 
those items contained in a little black book owing de-
cendent could be paid off to Jack on a percentage basis 
and nothing would be said about it, etc., was impressed 
that Jack Bundy may have been doing things which were 
detrimental to the estate and to the heirs thereof, and 
on its own motion caused a citation to be made requiring 
Jack Bundy to appear in Court for examination. 
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11 pon such exa1nination, it appeared after decedent's 
death, .A.ppellant Jack Bundy had taken into custody tires 
belonging to the partnership, had sold about $70.00 worth 
and had collected nothing, he didn't know how 1nany 
tires but the insurance thereon was $28.50; that there 
\Yere less than $500.00 'vorth of tires. He had Zerex and 
had given it to forn1er Company employees, and to him-
self to be used the following winter. When quizzed about 
a little black book, he stated, "I don't know anything 
about the little black book.'' This was a book be_longing 
to decedent in which some records were kept of gas, oil, 
times, and equipment sold (S Tr.). 
The statement of about August 10, 1946, showed he 
adnritted collections of $1350.00 and another $400.00; he 
had no details to support the collections, he had no rec-
ord; he had no records with respect to expenses claimed, 
except as shown road expense, $650.00 ; miscellaneous 
operating expenses, $500.00. He admitted making a state-
ment to the effect that he had promised Hadley that he 
would not divulge in Court the fact that Hadley might 
know where the book was. 
The examination of Jack Bundy, the admissions he 
made, convinced the Court that Jack Bundy had collected 
money and failed to account for it; had dissipated assets, 
the proceeds of which should have reached the estate; 
had secreted information of value to the estate. Under 
such circumstances, the Court finally ado:r'ted the view 
that Jack Bundy had all his share of the estate and per-
haps more. (R 206). Jack Bundy nevel appeared per-
sonally on the trial of the case. 
Respondent urges that a simplified paraphrase of 
the situation would be the following: 
Jack has collected and retained money belonging to 
the estate. 
The amounts are best or solely known by him. 
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He has not disclosed the amounts. 
The Court, under the circumstances, concluded that 
the amounts at least equaled the amount otherwise dis-
tributable to him from the estate. 
Certainly the burden of disclosure and accounting 
shifted to Jack Bundy and he has done nothing to carry 
such burden. 
To state the matter in a different way for clarity: 
May one keep the benefits of his defaulcations, in 
excess of the abilities of others to ascertain the precise 
amounts thereof? 
The facts of the exact amounts of money Jack Bundy 
has collected and retained; the quantities of fuel, oil, gas, 
tires, gravel, sand sold or converted, the accounts owing 
decedent, the partnership, and in turn the estate, collect-
ed or discounted are known to Jack Bundy alone. 
Appellant Dora Goddard in her brief says she does 
not desire to deprive Jack Bundy of his patrimony. So 
says Respondent. Respondent adds that a mothering of 
this boy since about 1923 prevents her from seeking the 
ultimate redress against him, and has stayed her hand 
throughout these proceedings. 
The sole questions then on this point are, has Jack 
Bundy already received his patrimony, or has he by his 
conduct at least, become in no position to object to the 
Court's decisions in any respect and in no position to 
challenge the Administratrix in any fashion. The Trial 
Court has determined both. These affirmatively. 
Point 3. The Administratrix was properly allowed 
credit upon her accounting for family allowance. 
On this point, chronologically, decedent died June 12, 
1946, Respondent was appointed and qualified as Ad-
10 
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n1inistratrix July 8, 1946, Petition for Ftunily Allowance 
filed ... ~\ pril ~D, 1947; hearing thereon, and Order of Fix-
ing and Allowing, made and filed May 12, 19±7; First 
.A.ccount and Report and Petition for Partial Distribu-
tion filed ... \.pril13, 1947, hearing thereon August 25, 1947, 
and Order Approving, Allowing and Settling First Ac .. 
count and Report and Ordering Partial Distribution 
1nade and filed ~\.ugust 27, 19-±7; Second and Final Ac-
count and Report and Petition for ]j-,inal Distribution 
filed ~lay 16, 1949; Objections to Accounts of Adminis-
tratrix and Cross Petition thereto filed July 8, 1949. 
Appellants apparently conceed that here is an order 
for family allowance, which, unless it was obtained by 
extrinsic fraud or the underlying petition therefore was 
insufficient and failed to give to the Court jurisdiction 
in the matter, is valid. Appellants' claim this to be a 
direct attack upon the order despite the objections filed 
in the proceedings are to the accounts of the Adminis-
tratrix. 
Extrinsic fraud as we understand it is: 
"25 C. J. page 332 
Extrinsic. Being outside of or external to the 
nature of an object or case." 
And note thereunder (b). 
''Extrinsic or collateral fraud'' is ''actual 
fraud, such that there is on the part of the person 
chargeable with it the malus animus, the mala mens 
putting itself in motion and acting in order to take 
an undue advantage of some other person for the 
purpose of actually and knowingly defrauding him.'' 
Flood v Templeton 152 Cal 148, 155, 92 P 78, 13 
LRANS5797, and other cases cited supporting the 
text. 
Now what do Appellants' say with respect to the 
11 
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evidence to show such : 
Mrs. Bundy is step mother of Dora and Jack. 
Dora lived in Missouri. 
Jack lived out of town. He was not one with any 
great capacity for business detail. 
Mrs. Bundy was a surviving partner in decedent's 
partnership and disqualified to act as Administratrix. 
To answer what must clearly appear to be the only 
conceivable comment with pertinant merit, Jack and 
Dora on June 20, 1946, signed an instrument reading: 
''Comes now John A. Bundy and Dora B. God-
dard, two of the heirs at law in the above entitled 
matter and do hereby recite that they together with 
Lovina R. Bundy are the only persons interested in 
the above entitled estate and in Ora Bundy and 
Company, a co-partnership, and in which partner-
ship Ora Bundy was a member and consent that said 
Lovina R. Bundy be appointed administratrix in 
the above entitled estate and do hereby waive any 
ineligibility she might hav~ by reason of her being 
a surviving partner in said co-partnership." (Tr. 
25, 26). 
Can it be that any of the foregoing be urged by 
Appellants as seriously a showing of extrinsic fraud? 
Can it be that with Mrs. Bundy being the only possible, 
available and capable person surviving to wind up the 
partnership and secure to the estate that part distribu-
table to the estate, her act in so doing is one of extrinsic 
fraud? The answers are obvious. · 
There is no claim made by Appellants' that Re-
spondent failed, in any respect, to properly wind up said 
partnership. Next Appellants' point out that the exercise 
of the rights of Respondent as widow seeking family 
12 
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allo\\~ance and Respondent a~ Ad1ninistratrix are dia-
Inetrieally opposed. And this is urged as evidence of 
extrinsic fraud. 
But for those cases in probate where there be either 
a corporate adn1inistrator, or executor, and those where 
an adininistrator or executor are persons entirely apart 
fron1 the fan1ily of the decedent, administrations of 
estates are carried on by the surviving spouse in the 
1nain. The law recognizes and provides for, and gives 
preference to the surviving spouse so to do and the law 
does so irrespective of the fact that family allowances 
1nay be claimed, hon1estead be claimed, and other rights. 
That Res-pondent be widow and claim family allowance, 
and claim homestead rights, etc., and Respondent be Ad-
Ininistratrix does not point whatsoever to extrinsic fraud, 
but Appellants' so urge. 
• 'Letters of Administration'' R.S.U. 1943 
'' 102-4-1. To whom Granted 
Administration of the estate of a person dying 
in testate mttst be granted to some one or more of 
the persons hereinafter mentioned, the relatives of 
the deceased being entitled to administer only when 
they are enti_tled to succeed to his personal estate 
or some portion thereof; and they are, respectively, 
entitled thereto in the following order: 
(1) The surviving huband or wife". 
(Underscoring ours) 
"Family Support" R. S. U. 1943 
''102-8-1 POSSESSION OF HOMESTEAD 
AND EXEMPT PROPERTY - ALLOWANCE 
DURING ADMINISTRATION'' 
(Dealing with homestead and family allowance 
to suriving spouse) 
13 
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Next Appellants point to withdrawal of $1,500.00 
by Respondent from the assets of the estate for family 
allowance December 30, 1946, (R 081). Respondent, 
however, invites the Court's attention to refund made by 
her to the estate of $1,500.00 on June 21, 1947, (R 080), 
and to the account, loans collected $1,500.00 (R 075). 
Respondent likewise! invites the Court's attention to dis-
bursements made from the assets of t~e estate to Ap-
pellant John A. Bundy and for his benefit in the sums 
of $3,000.00, $786.00, $103.15, and $35.00, a total of 
$3,924.45, (R 161) less a refund of $635.00 (R 160), a net 
of $3,289.45, which sum is chargeable against him as 
clearly shows in the Final Account and Report, these too, 
without prior Court approval. And further to Appel-
lant John A. Bundy was distributed the title to a truck of 
a value of $1,100.00, merely upon her ex parte application 
to the Court, without hearing (R 126). This is urged by 
Appellants' as and for an added showing of extrinsic 
fraudulent conduct on the part of the Administratrix. 
Respondent suggests that if this be extrinsic fraud, then 
she is guilty of such fraud. She urges, however, that 
it is not, and points to the entire record and to the ob-
jections thereto and declares that there is no charge or 
finding that her records, and accounts are in error, ev~n 
of a cent. 
Contrary to Appellants' observation, "It is interest-
ing to note that she apparently did not feel the need for 
asking the Court for a family allowance until some ten 
months after Decedent's death-etc.'' The need there-
fore clearly appears when an advance loan for family 
support in the sum of $1,500.00 was required and an ad-
vance from the partnership in the sum of $2,000.00 was 
also required. The former sum was repaid to the estate; 
the latter sum was deducted from the liquidating 
dividend in the Partnership. 
Now what are the facts in this case relative to the 
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need of the "·idow to support by way of fa1nily allowance. 
In 19±6, the inco1ne of the 'vidow as stifulated (Tr 
2, 3) 'Yere as follows: 
Incon1e fron1 "--ater stock rentals ............ $ 40.50 
Incon1e fro1n life insurance policy------------ 175.00 
Income from ~ ~ G'' Bond interest____________ 25.00 
TOTAL·---------------------------------------$240.50 
Liquidation of investment in Ora Bundy & Co. pro-
duced $1739.19, proceeds of insurance $1017.30. No 
income was had from '' E '' bonds, or from her home. 
In 19±8 the income of the widow apart from partial 
distribution and family allowance was $1382.24 ( Tr 6) 
and was from rentals, water stock, partnership liquida-
tion and interest. 
The sum received on pa.rtial distributiDn together 
\vith sale of her home enabled the widow to procure 
housing and enabled the commencement of an income 
from such sources by way of rentals from portions of the 
house. 
It is readily admitted that the widow could have sold 
either" E" bonds, ''G" bonds, her water stock, her home, 
her furniture and from such sources secured a living, 
and after she received her third of the amount dis-
tributed to her in partial distribution, this too could have 
been used. 
Does however the laws of Utah or the cases there-
under contemplate that family allowance is payable only 
in the event that the widow have no property whatsoever 
which she may sell and dispose of for her lively hood? 
We believe that the following excerpts answer this. 
In RE: Pugsley's Estate 
76 Pac 560 
27 u 489 
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''The statute was not enacted merely for the 
purpose of providing properly for indigent widows 
and children during the administration of their 
decedents' estates, but for all persons mentioned 
therein, regardless of their ability to provide for 
themselves out of their own private property. Such 
statutes, like homestead and exemption laws, are 
enacted because of a benevolent and humane con-
sideration of the helpless condition and distress of 
families occasioned by the death of those who had 
furnished their support and protection, and they 
must be construed with the same spirit of liberality 
that prompted their enactment. By the enactment of 
such laws the Legislature, under a wise public policy 
seeks to guard and protect the family, which con-
stitutes the foundation of the State itself, during the 
trying period of affliction and need caused by the 
death of the one who directed the family affairs. The 
statute under consideration, as will be seen by an 
examination of it, does not make dependence on an 
allowance a pre-requsite to such an allowance. It 
grants to the surviving wife or husband or children 
who may constitute the family of the deceased the 
use of the homestead and properly exempt from 
execution until the court shall otherwise direct, and 
then provides that during administration they ''shall 
receive such allowance out of the estate as the court 
may deem necessary and reasonable for their sup-
port.'' The language of the first part of this last 
provision is express and mandatory; that of the lat-
ter part, discretionary. Upno proper application 
absolute ·right; but the amount thereof rests within 
therefore, some allowance must be granted as of 
the sound descretion of the court, and is not subject 
to interference by the appellate court, except in a 
case of a clear abuse of discretion. The period for 
which an allowance must be granted, under this 
16 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
~tatute, is ··during adntinistration'' of the estate. 
And further fron1 the sa1ne case, the Court quote~ 
'Yith approval fron1 
S.A. WYERS HEIRS v SAWYER 
2S Ut. 245 
"If it had been the purpose of the Legislature 
to allo'v n1aintenance only in the case of such widow 
and children as were without the means of sub-
sistence in any other mode, it is difficult to con-
jecture ho'v it occured that the provision should have 
been expressed in the general and unlimited manner 
it here is. It is incomprehensible that, if the pro-
visin were intended only for the indigent and the 
necessitous, i~ should have been made general.'' 
..~..\.nd further fro1n the sa1ne case, the Court quotes 
with approval from·: 
In re Lux 
100 Cal. 593 
35 Pac. 341 
''The allowance is to be sufficient to provide 
all the necessaries of life, and this will include all 
those things which are reasonable and proper for 
use in the home and in social intercourse, in view 
of the condition and value of the estate and the 
station and surroundings of the family.'' 
Following the presentation of evidence on the trial 
in this case, after those matters of income of the widow, 
the payment of family allowance, the receipt of proceeds 
of liquidation and all had been testified to, the Judge of 
the Court (Tr 109, 110) in effect held that had he had 
before him all the evidence, income, financial worth etc., 
as it bears on family allowance adduced in this hearing, 
he would have been under the same opinion he now was, 
17 
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and would have made the order allowing the same as he 
did and had all of these matters been in the original peti .. 
tion he would have allowed the family allowance as he 
did. 
The Petition for Family Allowance (R 033), the 
Order Fixing Day (R 038), the Notice (R 036), Affidavit 
of Mailing and Posting Notices (R 037), and the Order 
(R 042) are all in the form and comply with the law and 
the practice and proceedure of the District Court in this 
Judicial District. 
Point 4. Administration has not delayed closing of 
estate beyond August 27, 194 7, and the receipt of family 
allowances subsequent to partial distribution was proper, 
was authorized and confirmed. 
Argument is made that partial distribution on Au-
gust 27, 194 7, should have resulted in the discontinuance 
of family allowance. 
At the risk of over simplification, with its admitted 
attendant in accuracies, but in order that the real es-
sence of the problem can be viewed, apart from the 
"trimmings," if I may be pardoned for a decent into 
venculiar, I present for inspection the following: 
Decedent died; Widow sought and was granted a 
family allowance; in course· of administration she re-
ceived partial distribution from estate; claimed family 
allowance to close of adminstration. 
Quries : Does partial distribution terminate family 
allowance? ~oes it amount to a fraud that family al-
lowance be paid subsequent to partial distribution? 
Responses : A family allowance is provided by law 
R.S.U. 1943, 102-8-1; it runs until otherwise directed by 
the Court; the order of the court herein provides that it 
continue until further order of the Court; until partial 
distribution, the widow, to support herself, could have 
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sold assets, of ho1ne, furniture, \Vater stock and bonds, 
and eould thereafter, have in additiona, used the partial 
distribution for her support. She did none of these and 
invested the partial distribution in a home and remodel-
ing thereof from whicp subsequently, income began. 
The purpose of family allowance is to provide bene-
fit \Yido'v \vith support from husband's estate, comence-
rate \vith the seale of living at time of death, if estate ade-
quate so to provide, and to do so all during the course of 
the adnrinistra tion of his estate unless the court other-
"~se order. ..A .. purpose of administration is to ultimately 
turn over assets of decedent to his heirs. 
The theory argued for by appellants would, if car-
ried out logically, result in this: 
Upon a final distribution, all of those sums paid to 
a widow during the course of administration as family 
allowance should be deducted from her distributive share 
to the extent that her distributive share be adequate to 
repay such family allowance payments. 
If viewed in another fashion, carried to an obvious 
absurdity, the same result in effect sought by appellants 
would be for the estate in lieu of ihe payment of a family 
allowance, make monthly partial distributions; for if the 
estate is solvent, there would never result a contest be-
tween creditors and the widow, and if the estate is in 
such liquid form as a family allowance could be paid by 
the same token it would be in such liquid form as to 
permit monthly partial distributions. 
Family allowance as are homestead exemptions, and 
costs of administrations, have at all times been viewed 
as expenses of the entire administration rather than, at 
least so far as family allowance and homesteads are con-
cerned, as a pre-payment upon ultimately distributable 
shares and interests. 
The Courts attention is respectfully called to the 
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petition filed whereby partial distribution was sought 
and and therein (R 078) 
''leaving an apparent surplus of cash at this time 
of at least $30,000.00 ~hich should be distributed to 
the heirs in order t-hat it may be, by them, put to 
productive use.'' 
(Underscoring ours) 
The other principal matter under this point is the 
vailed charge, that in effect the Respondent continued 
the administration of this estate past the time when it 
could or should have been closed with the intent to de-
fraud the other heirs by reason of the continued receipt 
.of family allowance. 
The Courts inspection of the file will reveal that 
rna tters concerning sale of real estate ( R 085 etc.) ; con-
veyance of title to personal property under contract with 
decedent (R 098 etc.); Federal"Inheritance Tax matters 
(R 105 etc.); release of mortgage (R 118 etc.); consent 
to transfer of title (R 126 etc.) ; and State Inheritance 
Tax rna tters ( R 139 ect.) ; are rna tters carried on in Court 
transactions subsequent to partial distribution, and ac-
tivity insident to all of these matters; and receipts and 
disbursements in· addition go for to belie the c~arge 
of intent to defraud levied at the Administratrix. 
Point 5. Compensation to the Administratrix was 
properly allowed. 
Utah Code Annotated 1943, as amended provides: 
''102-11-25. Commissions or Compensation 
When no compensation is provided by the will, 
or the executor renounces all claim thereto, he must 
be allowed commissions upon the amount of estate 
accounted for by him, as follows * * * rates set 
forth * * * . The same commissions shall be allowed 
to administrators. In all cases such further allow-
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ance nulY be n1ade as the court 1nay dee1n just and 
reasonable for any extraordinary service, but the 
aggiegate an1ount or both co1nmissions and extra 
allowance shall not exceed twice the a1nount of the 
conunissions above specified. All contracts between 
an executor or administrator and an heir, devisee 
or legatee for a higher compensation than that al-
lowed by this section shall be void.'' 
The Court belo,Y, during the course of the hearing, 
said; (Tr 104) 
• 'Now under the circumstances I am inclined to 
be of the opinion Mrs. Bundy is not only entitled to 
the fees of administratrix - had it been either of 
the banks I an1 sure they would have been three 
times the administratrix fee in here for extra com-
pensation.' ' 
The activities of the Administratrix were well known 
to the Court; matters concerning its estate being brought 
numerous times before it. The court was advised, and 
too were the objectors, that the expected estate adminis-
tration liabilities, as distinguished from the tax liabili-
ties, would amount to $5,000.00 (R 085) and such for the 
fees of"the attorney $3023.11, and statutory commissions 
of the adn1inistratrix, $1736.56, total $4,759.67, somewhat 
less than had been approximated in pleadings of August 
1947. 
While U.R.C.P. Rule 15 (b) would allow the Court 
to permit issues to be heard .and amendments to the 
pleadings to be made at the trial, the exercise of such 
rule is clearly within the discretion of the court and it 
is in no wise mandatory that the court allow amendment. 
As a matter of fact testimony was aduced nevertheless 
respecting orally claimed waiver of commission (Tr 10) 
and such together with the record evidence of perform-
ance of activities by the Administratrix and of claim 
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for the normal statutory commissions justified the Court 
in its finding and decision of the meritorious entitle-
ment of the adminitsratrix to such commissions. 
The absence of any showing of fraud, willful default, 
gross negligence or misconduct in the administration of 
this estate entitling or warrenting the deprivation of the 
administratix of statutory commissions is so patient that 
respondent submits the matter to this court upon the 
basis of he pleadings, testimony, proof and what has else-
where been said in this brief upon the matter. 
Point 6. The determination by the Court that 
$100. is the amount chargeable to Administratix for 
a 10 foot strip of real property was proper. 
As this court is perhaps aware by this time in con-
sidering the briefs of council in the m~tter, together with 
the pleadings, testimony, and documentary exhibits, for 
some time prior to the filing of the final account and 
petition, efforts were expanded to consumate a partition 
of the estate in harmony with the desires of all heirs. In 
that connection Mrs. Bundy proposed to charge herself 
$450.00 for a strip or tract of land 10 foot wide lying 
adjacent to the property owned by her upon which stood 
her home. (Exhibit B) this tract had been appraised by 
the estate appraisers at $100.00, by the Utah Inheritance 
Tax appraisers at $450.00 and in the Federal Inheritance 
Tax inventory it is shown at $100.00. The home did not 
stand on -this strip. The truck was distributed exparte 
to Jack Bundy, at $1100.00 the estate appraised value 
thereof. Throughout all negotiations the estate appraise-
ment was used rather than any other appraisement al-
though inheritance tax appraisements in part differed 
from the estate appraisement. Even in the attempted 
negotiations respecting partition and distribution such 
estate appraisement values were used. except where ad-
justments figured in stocks and bonds to bring such 
values to current condition so that an equality would be 
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~stnblished ""here one took eash in lieu of nssPts in an-
other form. 
Since the initiation of contest therein the \vidow has 
not by pleading or by testimony, or by an intimation of 
any sort agreed to be charged in the estate "\\rith $-l-50.00 
for this 10 foot strip of land. The land itself while \Yorth 
$100.00 is not \vorth in excess thereof when considered 
as it was, a vacant tract. It was not an indespensible 
adjunct to the 'vidow's land and 'vhile it 'vould be value-
less to anyone individually owning but the 10 foot strip, 
it \vas of value if added to another and larger tract. 
Appellants' council's statement on the matter is perhaps 
better than my own when he says: 
''While the appraisers in their routine appraise-
Inent might have felt the value to the estate was only 
$100.00 when the land was considered as an isolated · 
10 foot strip, yet when it became legally attached to 
the property of the Respondent Administratrix and 
was an integral part of a valuable home, its value 
\vas obviously increased.'' 
I cannot believe however that the obviously in-
creased value arising if and when attached to other 
property, is the measure of the value of the land when 
such land is considered and appraised as a 10 foot strip 
\vhich of course is the only value properly which could 
be made upon the tract. 
The endeavour of the Respondent to lean over back-
wards in her dealing with the Appellants pri<Jr to contest, 
far from showing a "double dealing" as Appellants 
council characterizes it, unquestionably sho\vs an attitude 
to deal in those matters which effected her personally' in 
a manner absolutely free from question. 
The Court has charged the widow with the value of 
the 10 foot strip as determined liy appraisers duly ap-
pointed herein for such purpose. No attack was ever 
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n1ade on the inventory and appraisement values. The 
deterinination of the District Court in this matter should 
be sustained. 
Point 7. Appellants' motion for leave to file out of 
time and motion to amend findings and Decree and their 
motion for a new trial were properly denied by the Court. 
The findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the 
Decree were made and entered herein April 29, 1950. 
The motion to amend findings of fact conclusions of 
law and Decree of Final Distribution was served and 
filed May 22, 1950. 
U.R.C.P. Rule 52 (b) under the title Findings by the 
Court, provides in part as follows: 
''Amendment. Upon motion of a party made 
not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the 
court may amend its findings or make additional findings 
and may amend the judgment accordingly.'' 
(underscoring ours) 
There can be no enlargement of the time for making 
such n1otion under the- following provision: 
U.R.C.P. Rule 6 (b) 
''Enlargement. Who by these rules or by .a 
notice given thereunder or by order of court an act 
is required or allowed to be done at or within a spe-
cified time, the court for causes shown may at any 
time in its discretion (1) with or without motion or 
notice order the period enlarged if request therefore 
is n1ade before the expiration of the period originally 
prescribed or as extended by a previous order or 
(2) upon motion made after the expiration of the 
specified period permit the act to be done where the 
failnre to act was the result of excusable neglect; 
but it may not extend the time for taking any action 
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nnder Rules 23, 50 (b) 52 (b) 59 (b) (d) and 
(e)~ 60 (b) and 73 (a) and (g), except to thP rxtent 
and under the conditions stated in them.'' 
(underscoring ours) 
.A.nd w·e point out that under the above quoted Ru1e 
5~ (b) there are no conditions nor authorizations for 
the extension of time nor relief for default, resulting 
either from excusable, or non excusable neglect, or at all. 
lTnder the provisions of U.R.C.P. Rule 58 A (c) a 
judgment is complete and shall be dee1ned entered for all 
purposes when the same is signed and filed as herein 
above provided. 
:Jiotion for new trial was not made and served on or 
before the expiration of the 10 day period prescribed by 
U.R.C.P. Rule 59 (b). 
''A motion for a new trial shall be served out 
not later than 10 days after the entry of judgment.'' 
Actual filing of the motion was May 22, 1950. 
There can be no enlargement of the time for making 
such 1notion under U.R.C.P. Rule 6 (b) quoted above. 
And we point out that under the above quoted Rule 
59 (b) there are no conditions nor authorizations for the 
extension of time nor relief for default, resulting either 
from excusable, or non excusable neglect, or at all. 
The motion for order relieving Default and leave to 
file motions and for Amendment of Findings and Decree 
and motion for New Trial together with affidavit in sup-
port thereof are in view of the foregoing, redundant. 
It is brought to the attention of the Court that it 
was April 24, 1950 when the Court filed its Memorandurn 
Decree dated April 22, 1950 and ever since on or about 
April 24, 1950, Appellants' council has had a copy of 
such Decree as has Respondents' council. 
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It is urged that all of said motions were properly 
denied by the court after due consideration of them to-
gether with the affidavits filed by respective council. 
The case of Hill vs. Hews 320 US 520 is not helpful 
and is inapt in as much as the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEEDURE are clear an unambiguous in the mat-
ters. Had it been the \ntention in Utah to have the com-
Inencement of the running of time to be conditioned upon 
the action of the Clerk of this Court the rules could have 
readily so provided and we should not attempt to read 
in to the rules that which is not presently there, nor to 
ereate an ambiguity in the practice of the law \vhere 
no ambiguity now subsists. 
CONCLUSION 
The Respondent has attempted to meet and discuss 
those arguments of Appellants, of significance; the argu-
Inents leading out to "fringes" have in most instances 
been disregarded; not because they are unanserable, but 
because of their diversionary character, and insignifi-
eance. Even thus, this brief is overly long and regret-
fully repetitious. 
The stewardship of the Respondent, upon comple-
tion of all her activities in the estate, has suddenly been 
attack. To the right of Appellants to attack, Respondent 
does not take issue: responsibility for each and every 
activity taken by her, she does not seek to evade. 
Respondent asks only that this Court review her 
activities, and measure her perfomance of the duties of 
her trust in the light of the complexities of the activities 
and all surrounding circumstances. 
The conclusion of Respondent, the conclusion of this 
Court sought, is that the Decree· of Final Distribution 
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entered below, be confirmed: that the appeal of Appel-
lants, be dismissed. · 
Respectfully submitted, . 
David K. Holther 
Attorney for Respondent 
602 Eccles Building 
Ogden, Utah. 
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